Monday, July 15, 2019

Book Club


Non-football book this month. This book is fascinating. An economic reporter wrote about the drug trade by looking at it as if it wasn't an illegal enterprise. How would the business model be evaluated from a purely economic perspective? How could that economic information inform the approach to drug regulation and law enforcement? This book is an easy, interesting read and simply provides a view of the drug trade from an entirely new perspective. 


Sunday, July 14, 2019

Pop Up Clinic

Saturday, July 13, 2019

Cover 1 Double #1

This is a guest post from Chris Vasseur. Chris is currently the Defensive Coordinator at Clovis HS in California. He is also the host of the Deep Dive on Defense Podcast for USA Football. Vass is always learning and talking football if you have questions about this article or are looking for good football info follow him on twitter @CoachVass. When I asked if he would write something for the site he asked "Can I tell a story?" So here is a story from a great football coach and a great friend. -Brian


COVER 1 DOUBLE JERSEY #
The story of how I did everything you’re not supposed to do for the biggest game of my life and not be fired from the coaching profession

In 2017, I faced a monumental task of coaching against a school with what would end up being the #1 offense in the country, in a state championship game.  They had a QB with offers from USC, UCLA, FSU, and Arizona State, where he ended up going, a RB that would end up at Arizona, and scariest of all, a WR named Darren Jones (who will be referred to as #1 the rest of the piece). #1 is 6’8 and had over 2000 yards receiving in one year.  Their #2 and #3 (hell, their #4, #5, and #6 WRs) were pretty good as well.  Not to mention a 6’6 245 pound DE who doubled as a TE in jumbo packages, with offers from Alabama and Texas A&M among others, coming in to play TE next to Randy Moss Jr. on short yardage downs.  We were outmatched, to say the least.  To make matters worse, we found out this team was our opponent on a Sunday morning, and had to play the state game on Friday at 4 pm.  We didn’t have a lot of time…

I turned the film on and was terrified.  They were every bit as good as I thought they would be… really, even better – they were explosive, crisp, and well coached.  Their schemes were varied, effective, yet simple enough to be done while going fast.  After having what my friends call my patented Chris Vasseur Meltdown™, I started tagging the games.  As I was tagging this team, I realized their best run was when the QB, Jayden Daniels would scramble.  It was the most explosive run they had, and it was going to hurt us if we didn’t do something differently.

I am a 4-2-5 guy to my core.  After starting my career as a student assistant at the University of Miami for a brief time, where I learned the Miami 4-3, I went to work at San Jose State as a Graduate Assistant doing football video.  There my met my mentor, Keith Burns, who taught me the “G Defense,” but with a twist.  He was one of the first guys to play those OLBs as DBs types and checked to Quarters vs. one back.  After a few years coaching high school football, I wanted more flexibility, so I studied the TCU defense.  To say I fell in love is putting it mildly; I learned every detail and it became an obsession.  I stalked TCU GA Brandon Lechtenberg who felt sorry for me and allowed me to pick his brain.  We kept in touch and a year and a half later, he hired me as his Corners coach at Millsaps College.  I learned the defense and exclusively studied it for six years.  There was only one way to coach defense – the Gary Patterson way.  That is until this fateful Sunday.

As I watched this team, I realized that our 4-2-5 defense would hurt us – we are a man match Quarters team and this team flared their back quite a bit.  If we matched the “Fast 3,” it would be a 4-0 box and the QB would take off and run all day.  We were thin at DL and moving guys around to compensate. Changing position and trying to mastering pass rush lanes ain’t easy five days before the biggest game of your life.  Plus, if we did attempt to cage him, we would just be sitting there and letting him have all day in the pocket to throw.  I also knew we needed to double their stud WR (#1) – there was no way around it. I was starting to think we needed to play 3 down, something I had NEVER done as a base.  I was afraid it would be too much to put in and I didn’t know it well.  Plus, can you REALLY throw your defense out five days before a state championship game!?   The previous year, we had started 0-4, won 10 in a row, and lost the state game in a heart breaker.  We were back in the big dance and I wondered out loud if it was really smart to do this?   So I called two of my closest confidants, Chris King, DC of St. John Bosco in Bellflower, CA and Brian Vaughn, the owner of this website.  I didn’t want to give them my thoughts, especially about switching to 3 down – I wanted their opinion without tainting their perspective. 

I kept watching the film, scribbling down ideas, and as the night fell, I heard back from both guys.  Both coaches, at that time to my understanding, were “4-2-5 guys.”  As we talked about the opponent, they started echoing the same things I saw – the QB scrambling was their scariest run, their line was physical, and I had to figure out a way to double the 6’8 WR with 2000 yards receiving.  But the most striking advice is what I had thought but didn’t disclose: “you should think about playing 3 down with two 4is sprinkled in.”  That previous spring I had visited my former boss (and now current boss), Rich Hammond.  I was there clinic-ing his DC and in the evening, we exchanged ideas.  During that time, he had shown me Dave Aranda’s Tite front.  To show you how smart I am, I looked at it with my 4 down snobbery and I believe my exact quote was, “there are no edges, there is no pass rush… this is #$&!ing stupid, I’d never @%&$ing do this.”  (Coaches… as a sidebar, never ever never ever ever question the wisdom of Dave Aranda EVER).  Now, 4 ½ days before kickoff, I am trying to figure it out with zero resources, cursing myself for not paying more attention to Rich. I called our head coach at Serra, Patrick Walsh, and told him we would roll the dice and switch things up.  Coach Walsh has many amazing qualities, but one of his best is trusting his assistant’s judgment and having faith in them.  Coach Walsh blessed the overall plan and shared the sentiment that we needed to do something different.

So the basic plan was this:  On run/playaction/RPO downs, play Tite front with Quarters/Palms away from #1 and Cover 5 Wall (TCU’s version of Man Match Cover 2) to the side of #1.  We had played these coverages before so we were in familiar territory.  If it was Trips, we would play Special/Stubbie/Mini/Lock to the Trips and take our Dime and press the X WR on the backside with a 1/2 defender over the top, where #1 usually played.  We had some other ideas to pick our spots in the blitz game, getting into 4 down and play Cover 1 if we had problems stopping the run, and a way to revert back to our base defense if everything went to hell.

The next question became, what would we do on passing downs?  Chris and Brian provided some great ideas and I combed ideas I keep in a super secret doc (don’t bother asking it’s going to my grave), that is about 250+ pages of stuff I have seen, done, wanted do, organized by types of offenses, formations, personnel groups, defending certain people, etc. The problem with defending #1 besides him being Megatron reincarnated is that he played all four receiver spots in 2x2 and 3x1, even lining up at some tailback.  As our Safeties coach Lyndon McGee created the hit chart for his routes based on where he was, I kept looking and racking my brain.  I was on the phone with Blitzology (that’s his real name, don’t act like it’s not) and he sent me a picture of a rotational Cover 3 concept that would self adjust no matter where #1 was.  I loved the idea as we had planned on doing something similar for base downs, but we don’t play Cover 3.  As he was talking it dawned on me: play Cover 1 Double Jersey #!  

One of my closest friends in this business is James Light.  James has done more for me than I will be able to repay and I feel so lucky that I get to call him a friend.  If it weren’t for him, I am not friends with Chris, I never go to Georgia which got me on the Saban Tree defensive journey that I am on, and my best friend is not the Offensive Coordinator at St. John Bosco.  Cover 1 Double Jersey # is a coverage James had tweeted about and I always was intrigued.  The basic premise of the coverage is that you double the WR you want to stop with the deep safety to the side he is on, and the other deep safety plays the MOF.  From there, you decide on the type of bracket you use vs. each position the WR can line up at based on the routes they run.  To me, 1 Double # is more a concept then a specific set of rules.  You can put basic camp rules in, but it’s customized to stop a certain person so putting in “camp” rules doesn’t make much sense to me, if you’re just going to change it when you play the guy you need to double.  However, NFL teams put it in their playbook to practice in camp, where formations are more stagnant.  Note: Also, I only recommend using it if the WR moves around a lot.  If he is always the left WR, you can set your rules much easier, and don’t need to put the whole concept in, but I digress. 

I trust Coach Light and his endorsement alone was enough to make it worth doing.  However, he had some pretty good coaches backing up his assertion.  1 Dbl Jersey # is Bill Belichick’s go-to when playing a stud WR on passing downs and he has used it extensively throughout the years.  The most famous example is when he used 1 Dbl #83 (the player they are doubling is included in the call) to combat Andre Reed in Super Bowl XXV as the Defensive Coordinator for the New York Giants.  The plan worked so well that is enshrined in Canton, opened to the page containing 1 Dbl #83.


 Belichick has also used the coverage various times over the years vs. Chad Johnson.  A video excerpt of Belichick talking about it can be found here, even teasing Johnson before the game, telling him he was going to be doubled: 


It was also revealed that the Patriots deployed this tactic vs. the Atlanta Falcons in Super Bowl LI on Julio Jones, after a whiteboard with their gameplan on it was left un-erased.  Keen observers like James Light believe they have seen the coverage also used against Antonio Brown, T.Y. Hilton, Travis Kelce, Michael Thomas, Tyreek Hill, and Robert Woods in the Super Bowl in February.  It’s safe to say it’s been used many other times before, between Reed and Woods, before the dawn of “Football Twitter” to figure it out.

Another coach who used the coverage is Belichick protégé, Romeo Crennel.  To understand an example of the rules, here is a copy of the page from a 2010 Kansas City Chiefs playbook when Crennel was the Defensive Coordinator.


Also, here are some drawings from the 2015 Houston Texans playbook when Romeo Crennel was the Defensive Coordinator.





Another coach on the Belichick tree that has used the 1 Dbl Jersey # is Nick Saban.  In general, Saban prefers to use a coverage called 7 Special, which doubles the opponents’ best receiver inside of his man-matching quarters structure.  However, he used it more this past season than any other year, having it in the gameplan for AJ Brown (Ole Miss), Jonathon Johnson (Missouri), Ryan Davis (Auburn), Mecole Hardman (Georgia), Hollywood Brown (Oklahoma), and Hunter Renfrow (Clemson). Over the last five years, Coach Saban has had gameplans to double Christian Kirk (Texas A&M), Travis Dural (LSU), and again double A.J. Brown (Ole Miss) and Hunter Renfrow in 2017.

Belichick has also incorporated it into 5-man pressures where instead of rushing 5 and playing with a MOF safety, the MOF safety doubles the star player.  In the Super Bowl, the Patriots brought a variety of 5-man pressures and sometimes added a tag called “Dbl #17.”  This tag told the Deep Safety who is usually responsible for the MOF, to double Robert Woods.   Anyway, back to our opponent.

I decided we would use the bracket concept and now it was time to decide how we would go about it.  I called long time friend John Rice to get some different options.  Besides being a world-class football coach and an even more amazing man, Coach Rice literally wrote the book on facing an offense similar to our opponent.  John’s groundbreaking book entitled “Defending the Spread Offense” was one of the first books written on the subject and has stood the test of time.  I had the generic concept from the Chiefs and Texans playbooks, and how Belichick had employed it over the years, but I wanted to create a menu of options.  Coach Rice has written extensively about the bracketing concept, and we went through the pros and cons of each type.  I thumbed through his book as John sent me more materials, talking through each call.

After hanging up with Coach Rice, I called Coach McGee to decide how we would play each Bracket.  We poured over the hit charts he created, studying each route #1 ran at each receiver spot by formation, and how many times he was targeted. We began choosing the corresponding bracket to see how they would fit to each concept, and the plan became to crystalize. All of the brackets above are done with a 4-man front.  However, our plan was to go 3 down, put one ILB on the back and leave another LB in the box as a spy on the QB.  We decided to take a chance and move our starting X receiver to defense to match up with #1. We felt he was such a good athlete and we needed a big body to match up with #1, we decided to roll the dice.  The player I am talking about is Patrick Nunn who stood at about 6’3” and could jump out of the gym.  One problem: he hadn’t played Corner all year long, or really ever before.  He now plays Safety at Washington State, which he had played for us in spot duty that year.  The plan was to move him move around and follow #1 to whichever side he lined up on.  Deciding on the brackets when #1 was playing at an inside WR position was easy – the low guy would play outside and the deep Safety would play inside (the Deuce Bracket in drawing #1).  The problem was:  what happened when he played at the #1 WR?  The best choice there was to play 2 Man Under.  The issue to me was that it didn’t make sense to have a 6’4” Corner trailing a 6’8” WR with a 5’10 Safety playing over the top.  It made more sense to flip it – have the shorter guy trail and let our big guy go up and contest the Fade balls. 

So, we devised a way to handle it.  If #1 was lined up as an inside WR, we would “Deuce” him as the drawings show above (down DB outside, deep Safety inside).  If it was Trips and he was the #2 or #3, we would “Deuce Bracket” both the 2nd and 3rd receivers.  When #1 was inside, the ball was going there, so we decided to take our chances and play man-to-man outside on the outside receivers.

If #1 aligned as the outside receiver in 2x2 or as the outside receiver to the Trips side in 3x1, we would check “Screw.”  This meant the defender over #2 would slide over to #1, the player who was normally the 1/2 Safety would come down and play man trail on #2, and the stud Corner we had would come back and play the 1/2.  This is an older concept that used to be used on the backside vs. a X receiver called “Thumbs.”  If it was 3x1, we would cover the 3rd WR with the Dime who would come over.  If #1 was the single WR, the Weak Safety would go press #1, the stud Corner would back up and play the 1/2, flipping responsibilities.  Also, to help away from the rotation, we gave the Corners relief by making Bail calls so they weren’t one-on-one in press the entire game.  As we studied more, we realized that the team had a “tell” based on a certain condition (I will refrain from giving the tell out of respect to the opponent).  If X happened, it was 60% pass, but if Y happened, it was 99% pass.  So, our final base plan was to play Tite with 1/2s to the stud when X happened, and check to Wide 5s and play our new 1 Dbl #1 coverage, which we called, “Screw.”  Here are brackets from our game plan. NOTE:  These match ups were specifically tailored to what this opponent did.  I HIGHLY recommend that you do not copy and paste this plan.  Take the theory shown here, and use the example shown below, to create your own plan.  This coverage will not work if you don’t customize it to what you see.


The defensive staff had our weekly Sunday night Skype call session and I reviewed the plan with our staff.  Line coaches Nicholas “The Eagle” Walsh, Matt McGinn, and our Inside Linebackers coach Kevin Dos Remedios all loved the plan, and embraced the change of the front 3.  The plan was officially set, but there was one small problem: when Monday practice rolled around, our secret weapon, Patrick Nunn, wasn’t there (he got very sick the night before).  After crying on the inside when finding out that the lynchpin to our game plan was not there, I tried to find a silver lining.  Their #2 WR was also REALLY good – our plan called to matchup our best guy on their best guy AND double him.  I started to wonder what would happen if they start beating us with their second best WR who was usually one of the outside receivers, with outside receivers generally harder to double!  The old “Deion principle” popped into my head and I started doodling before practice.  When Deion Sanders played for the Cowboys, they would sometimes put him on the teams 2nd best WR.  They knew he could handle that guy one-on-one, so they erased him with Deion and would then double the opponent’s best WR with two guys.  This way, they had some balance in the plan and weren’t completely selling out to stop one guy that the Cowboys lost to their second best guy.  First and foremost, you always want to take a way what a team does best but if you are putting all your chips on black every play, they just gotta hit red a few times and you’re toast.  So, we took the field and worked the “Deion Plan” with our 2nd Corner doubling #1 and making all of the adjustments and our 1st Corner (our 3rd best guy standing in for that practice) traveling with the 2nd best WR.  Our other personnel woes included playing without our top two defensive tackles, a starting ILB, and having to start two sophomores in the secondary, one of whom wasn’t cleared until two days before the game after sitting out the previous few weeks.

The week went on and we practiced our new defense, with Patrick coming back to practice on Tuesday.  As fate would have it, our #2 Corner, Chris Park, missed a day of practice as well with some sort of ailment.  Only having the full secondary for one practice made me question what I was doing – I knew I was taking a risk, but I felt I had no choice.  It helped that I was able to show the kids the NFL playbooks and tell the story about this coverage in the Hall of Fame to distract them from the fact that I was slightly terrified and this could backfire, leaving me with egg on my face.  I was doing everything you’re told not to do when you start first start coaching.  To make matters worse, I really do love our defense.  I believe in it.  I can anticipate how people will attack and most importantly, I know how to fix it.  After our penultimate practice of the season, I called Coach McGee and almost pulled the plug on the plan.  We weren’t executing like I wanted and the kids were confused.  The lack of cohesion relative to personnel was exacerbating the discomfort for the players and the staff.  I forgot how close I was to calling it off until I Coach McGee and I reminisced about the game. However, I knew deep down that no matter how good we were with our base, we were going to get killed if we continued doing what we had done all year.  But you know what they say, no risk it, no biscuit.  And if you’ve seen me, you know I love biscuits (especially Red Lobster ones).

Game day came around and the plan was deployed.  In addition to an effective defensive gameplan, Now don’t get me wrong - I have been wrong plenty in my career.  I’ve miscalculated on things, had plenty of bad ideas, and made a slew of other boneheaded mistakes.  But on this day, the football Gods shined on the Serra Padres… the calculated risk, the plan, the personnel moves – everything paid off and worked like a charm.  The Tite front rush confused the QB as he thought he had an edge to exploit.  The back would flare, one backer would expand, but the other would sit over the middle.  The QB would start to roll to escape the pocket, as the 4is looped to contain.  The QB would stop and the daylight rusher would step up and sack him.  This happened four times in the 1st Quarter.  Our kids played out of their minds with effort and tenacity that was jaw dropping.  The opponent averaged anywhere from 260-280 pounds up front and our 3 DL averaged a little over 200 pounds, but they held point.  My fear was confirmed on the #2 WR playing against out #2 Corner.  After trying to throw to #1 with little luck, the offense found the matchup they wanted.  To counter this, we enacted the “Deion Plan” to create a moving target.  The offense started figuring out our adjustment, and started winning with #1 again, so I randomized where our Corners would go.  We started by playing field and boundary for a few snaps, then flipping them, then playing left and right and back to our match ups with stud on stud, and then back to the Deion Plan.  It was a real live game of “Rock, Paper, Scissors” and I looked like a deranged conductor, flailing about.  

Our offense created a masterful plan to control the game.  Lead by current St. John Bosco Offensive Coordinator Steven Lo, the offense took control of the game and going into the last drive of the half, we were up 14-0.  Our Quarterback Luke Bottari took a shot in the ribs that briefly incapacitated him.  On the drive, Luke short armed a routine ball to a wide open receiver that would have put us up 21-0.  Instead, our opponent got the ball and drove to half field, before executing a Hail Mary to make it 14-7.  I ignored the advice of everyone in the stadium and didn’t deploy the “everybody-on-the-goal-line Hail Mary coverage.”  I didn’t like it, and I thought they would try Hitch n’ Pitch.  Why?  I don’t know – I guess I am a dumbass.  In the end, we had some guys there to make a play and he still out-jumped 4 defenders.  For the second week in a row, we were on the cover of MaxPreps for all the wrong reasons, with a great action shot of #1 towering above our boys to snag the ball out of the night sky (the previous week, Kazmier Allen set the national TD record for one season at 76, in a 30+ point win by us).  As we jogged to the locker room I couldn’t help but laugh.  Even though we had gotten embarrassed on the Hail Mary, I couldn’t believe the plan was working.

To start the 2nd half, Cajon drove 99 yards to make the score 14-14.  Our offenses responded.  With a wounded Quarterback and at one point, four Offensive Lineman that did not start the season (two season ending injuries, and two players who kept getting banged up during the game), we scored 24 unanswered points.  Our spread offense that averaged almost 50 points a game, switched to our short yardage/grind-it-out Double Tight, Double Wing package for the second half, only throwing 2 passes after halftime. Coach Walsh’s yearly crusade to develop depth at Offensive Line paid off, and flawless Special Teams coordinated by Ron Ortiz, we controlled the game on offense and played mistake-free football.

In the end, our opponent moved the ball between the 20s and actually outgained us, but we played lights-out Red Zone defense, created turnovers, forced coverage sacks, and most important, we were nails on 3rd Down. The plan was easier to execute because our opponent didn’t move #1 around much, besides flipping from one outside receiver position to the other.  The final was 38-14 and we were champions.  

I was stunned.  The gamble paid off.  We were able to bob and weave our way to victory with a once-in-a-lifetime game plan due to the uniqueness of the situation and the tell that allowed us to check coverages.  To this day, it is the happiest day of my life.  I will never forget the feeling and disbelief in winning a state championship, and in the process holding the #1 offense in the country to 14 points.  And it’s all because of some great players making plays and some scheme help from an array of coaches on and off our staff, Bill Belichick, James Light, Twitter, and the blog you are reading now. 


If you want to read more about the game, including quotes that helped me land my current job, you can go here.





Game Film


Clip 1 – first drive of the game and we had just given up a big play.  They were not expecting man and it looks like we had never played it before either.  They had 2 open guys, but we flushed him, helicoptered the QB, and forced a fumble.  That play never happens if our FS doesn’t make an INSANE, 100% effort, come-from-behind tackle.


Clip 2 – 2nd drive.  #1 is outside to the bottom of the screen.  Good coverage results in us forcing the QB out of bounds for a sack.


Clip 3 – 3rd drive – you can see the rotation and our kids’ ferocity. 


Clip 4 – 4th drive – great clip to show to see the coverage and the pass rush plan!  Tear in my eye



Clip 5 – Fitting the run on a Jet sweep.  They actually started running a lot more in the second half to try to get us to come down.  We weren’t having it.



Clip 6 – Allowed kids to bail to take away verticals, which I believe they only threw 3 or 4?  Probably my favorite clip.  210 pounds vs. 160… #5 who forced the fumble is a sophomore in the clip.  He was also our kicker the year before in the state game.  We had to pull him up as a freshman which is UNHEARD of where we coach.  He missed 2 extra points and we lost the state game by 2 points.  Redemption.



Clip 7 – good vice on the screen



Clip 8 – tried to hide #1 in a TE position.  Great coverage



Clip 9 – Hail Mary… they only have 10 guys on the field and still go up 1-on-4.  Our kids looked like they’d never seen a football before.  I jogged into the locker room laughing, because even with that play, I never thought we’d only give up 7 points in the first half.

Friday, June 21, 2019

Dressing Up Crossfire

On 3rd&8 Army is in a Nickel personnel with OLB body types at DE. 



The Rush:
Even front alignment with two 3 techniques. The Mike and Will are working a crossfire pattern with the Will first and the Mike going second. The pressure side DT is looping to balance the pass rush.

The Coverage:
3 under 3 deep firezone with the Corners pressed. The Rush backer is the 3 dropper and takes the RB through to the flat because the seam players are stretched with the 4 verticals concept. 



Against this play action protection the Center is threatened by the DT on the block back. The Center being occupied allows both ILB's free runs on the cross fire. This pressure design in an interesting way to cover all the OL and manipulate protection.

If Miami Ohio had instead been in a 6 man drop back protection the pressure still creates challenges. The 5 OL being covered forces half slide protection into a man to man concept. All the OL being manned up creates a run through for the Will on the RB. The late looping blitz by the Mike controls the pass set of the Center while still providing the late crossfire pattern. The late crossfire is rough for the manned up OL to pass off. Good stuff using a different alignment to dress up a classic crossfire firezone blitz from former Army and current UNC defensive coordinator Jay Bateman and the Black Knights.  


Sunday, June 16, 2019

3 Match Coverage Variation

Why do you need all those coverage calls? This is an example of why we need them.

Here is a stick route variation from 2x2.




The read progression:

Pre-snap the peak outside. The Peak is there for cover zero looks to take a shot against a press corner and also a hole shot vs. a cover 2 look. 

Hot - against any max pressure look the ball can go to the peak or the RB in the flat

Post-snap:

#1 read is the RB is the flat. If the overhang gets depth, turns his shoulders inside, or doesn't expand the RB in the flat is getting the ball immediately. 



#2 is the slot working away from the ILB. This route is designed to isolate the LB with a speed WR. If the LB gets depth or isn't attacking the route the ball is going to the WR running away from the LB.



#3 is the dig. If the LB is tight on the in/out route the ball is going to the dig route behind the LB. 


#4 The money ($$$) is for quarters coverage concepts. If the defense is 2 high with a safety who is aggressive on the dig the QB can take a shot to the post one on one vs. the corner.


Against a base odd front 3 match concept the defense can rush an OLB and roll the coverage to replace the pressure.


In this example the field OLB is in the charge with the coverage rolling that direction. The coverage can handle all the routes. The issue is the isolation of the ILB vs. a slot WR. This plays into what the offense is trying to accomplish. They want WR vs. LB which they hope is a mismatch.This is why we carry coverage change ups.


The charge is the same basic concept only now the end is working outside and the ILB is pressuring the B gap. The Safety is now the hook player. The coverage plays out the same only now the speed WR is 1 on 1 with a DB not a LB. 

This is just one example of a coverage change up that is not about changing the coverage concept just about job swaps. 

Having coverage change-ups is necessary to avoid an offense being able to repeatedly isolate a poor match up in coverage. 

Saturday, June 15, 2019

Book Club


This month is a pair of of books from an excellent coach with a career of experience coaching high school and college football. Coach Gordon's first book "Coaching the Under Front Defense" outlines how the front aligns and functions.



His 2nd book is a all about "Split Field Coverages". The book covers a fully developed coverage package. 



Both books are great reads. If you are a new coach looking to learn about under front or split field coverages these books are a great place to learn. If you're already experienced coaching these concepts this is a great chance to see a successful defensive coach's explination, progression, and coaching points. I took a bunch notes on details from Coach Gordon that I've added/I'm adding to our progression. 

Not convinced? Listen to Coach Gordon on the Deep Dive on Defense pod cast. Listen for the split field coverage info and killer Boston accent.


Thursday, June 13, 2019

Understanding RPO

When it comes to RPO's, there are many versions out there. The challenge defensive coaches face is how to teach RPO's to defenders. Every defense has a clearly established progression for concepts like defending triple option but defining roles & responsibilities for RPO's can be less clear. Well we have rules for quick game and rules for power, what do we do if it is both? RPO as a term has even become problematic. RPO has become a blanket term for a wide variety of offensive concepts. In response we have started breaking down RPO's into 4 categories to help defenders better understand how the RPO works. Understanding the play helps defenders better understand their role in defending the play. 

Access - Access RPO's are looking for free access (space) to throw a route. These are pre-snap decisions from the QB.



This is a simple example. The offense is running a zone read concept. The access portion is to the single WR side. If the there is no overhang defender and an off corner the QB is free to throw the hitch. QB scans pre-snap and if the look is there he throws the quick game route. This could also be a speed out or slant. This type of RPO is a fusion of 3 step quick game passing and a run. Offenses traditionally have thrown quick game on regular down & distance to get or stay on schedule. The issue was the quick game was good against certain looks and not good against others. Some teams employ kills or alerts that allow the offense to audible in and out of quick game at the LOS. Many teams however are uncomfortable allowing the QB to change the play. Enter access RPO and the OC can call the quick game and the run play with the same call. If quick game access is there take it, if not run the called play.

Access RPO is also used to control box numbers and can even be double sided.



If the defense puts defenders on the LOS, like the under front in this example there may be access to throw quick game to a split WR. The access is on both sides in this example. The thought process is if there is no overhang to the strong side and an off corner the hitch has access. 

If the defense rotates the coverage to the strong side the weak side access is in play.


With a strong side overhang the access hitch is dead. Now weak side the access slant may be a possibility for the QB to throw. 

Access RPO can also be used as a blitz control.


The offense does not have a blocker to account for the edge blitzer here. If the edge blitzer shows early the QB can throw the access bubble. This same concept is used to control any overhang aligned defender tight enough to the box where the offense may have trouble blocking. If the overhang player is loading the box by alignment the access bubble can be thrown.

Conflict - Conflict RPO's put an off the LOS defender into a run/pass conflict. The defender is being read post-snap. 




This example is the stick RPO play. The QB is reading the LB (Mike) if the Mike drops to cover the #3 receiver the ball is handed off. If the Mike fills to play the run the QB throws the route.

Another example is the stretch with back side slants.




The ILB (Mike) is the conflict player. If the Mike reacts to the stretch play away the QB can pull the ball out and throw the slant. If the overhang squeezes the inside slant the QB can throw the outside slant. If the Mike does not pursue the stretch the RB may have a seam to put his foot in the ground and get vertical as the flow of the play widens the defense. 

Triple - Triple RPO's use the pass as the third phase of a triple option concept. The third phase throw occurs post-snap.




The play is a zone read with the DE as the first read. The triple portion adds a "pitch" phase to the play. Here the WR screen is the third phase. If the overhang player (Sam) steps up to help play the QB the ball can be thrown out wide.

It is not limited to screens.Teams are also running routes as the third phase.


Here the TE arrow route is designed to stress the DE. If the DE widens with the TE release the play is an easy give read for the QB. If the DE chases the dive the QB can keep. Off the keep if QB is attacked by a defender he can rise up and throw the arrow in the flat. 

Hybrid - Hybrid RPO's are a combination of two of the previous types. These RPO's may have both pre and post-snap elements.



Pre-snap the QB can take the bubble if the overhang (Sam) is too tight to the box or showing blitz. Post-snap the safety is the conflict player. If the Safety is aggressive downhill into the alley the QB can pull the ball and throw the 8 yard glance in behind the safety.



Pre-snap if the hitch is there the QB can take it.
Post-snap the ILB is the conflict defender. If the Mike expands with the RB fast motion the QB keeps and runs following the fold block. If the Mike stays put the QB throws the swing to the RB. 

Why the slot fade? To control 1 high safety defenses(Cover 1, Cover 3, & 3 Match)



Now the defense can build a two LB box. If the pre-snap access hitch is there take it. If the corner is pressed throw the slot fade because the likely coverage is either Cover 1 or 3 Match.



Teams are creating all kinds of combinations.

Pre-snap the access bubble can be thrown if the overhang is too tight to the box or showing blitz. Post-snap the QB is running zone read. If the QB is forced to pull the ball, he has the ability to throw the ball out to a third phase on the bubble.

There are countless RPO concepts out there. Far too many to fit in one article. That is why we have tried to develop a categorizing system to make RPO concepts simpler for our coaches and players.

How do we use this info?

When we break down a team we will label the play Run/Pass/RPO. If the play was an RPO we label:

R/P - Did the RPO result in a run or a pass?
Run - What run concept was the play?
Route - What routes are being run? Even if they didn't throw it. 
Type - Access, Conflict, Triple, Hybrid

We want to understand the whole picture of how does the play work? The opposing defense on film played a hand in the outcome so only looking at the outcome does not tell the whole story. Players can then be informed of the play and how it works as well as our plan against it? Understanding how your pre-snap alignment affects access, or you are the read on a conflict, or there is a "pitch" on a triple, or there are pre and post-snap concepts happening are all critical for defenders to understand the play. That understanding helps players grasp the Why? of their responsibility in defending the play.